Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice
Volume 23

Issue 2

Article 8

4-1-2017

Virginia’s Interpretation of Ake v. Oklahoma: A Hollow Right
Andrew Monaghan Higgins
Washington and Lee University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure
Commons, and the Human Rights Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew Monaghan Higgins, Virginia’s Interpretation of Ake v. Oklahoma: A Hollow Right, 23 Wash. & Lee
J. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just. 491 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol23/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice at Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Virginia’s Interpretation of Ake v. Oklahoma:
A Hollow Right
Andrew Monaghan Higgins *
Table of Contents
I. Introduction .....................................................................491
II. Background ......................................................................494
A. Forensic Evidence and Convictions...........................494
B. Indigent’s Right to Expert Witnesses .......................498
C. State’s Access to Expert Witnesses ...........................501
D. DNA Alone to Convict................................................503
III. Ake Leads to Disparity ....................................................505
A. Federal Interpretaion ................................................505
B. Virginia’s Interpretation .................................................506
IV. Virginia’s Standard Applied ..................................................508
A. Standard Not Met ......................................................508
B. Standard Met .............................................................520
V. Problems ..........................................................................523
VI. Solutions ..........................................................................525
VII. Conclusion ........................................................................526
I. Introduction
Defendants in criminal trials in the United States have the
right to due process under the law. 1 The broad protection of the
Due Process Clause has been used to give defendants several
rights, and to protect the innocent and ensure that the guilty are
*
Candidate for J.D. 2017, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).; see also U.S. CONST.
amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
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not given a harsher punishment than our society deems
appropriate. 2 The United States has chosen the adversarial system
to determine truth and justice. 3 In the criminal context a
prosecutor puts forth inculpatory evidence in an effort to convince
a judge or jury that a defendant is guilty of the accused crime. 4
Courts grant the defendant the right to cross examine and disprove
any evidence that the prosecution has put forward. 5 In this context
the government wields enormous power and resources, and the
defendant is afforded certain rights, including the presumption of
innocence. 6
Due to modern advances in science, the use of evidence in
criminal trials has evolved. 7 Particularly in rape and murder
trials, the prosecution often presents scientific evidence. 8 The
government has the resources at its disposal to hire scientists to
present and explain the evidence to the court, but defendants often
lack the means to hire their own scientists to challenge the
prosecution’s evidence. 9 The adversarial nature of trial and the
2. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (finding that the
Constitution requires state courts to appoint an attorney for criminal defendants
who cannot afford one on their own).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting defendants the right to confront
witnesses against him, compelling witness in his favor, and have counsel to assist
in defense); David A. Harris, Criminal Law, the Constitution, and Truth Seeking:
A New Theory on Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 469, 512 (1992) (“[T]he constitutional rights designed to make real
the assumptions of the adversary system—that the prosecution and defense
present the strongest, relevant available evidence to the factfinder, which can
then arrive at the most accurate decision possible.”).
4. See Harris, supra note 3, at 496–97 (explaining the fundamentals of
criminal trials and how they are influenced by money).
5. See id. at 505–06 (detailing the right of criminal defendants to engage in
cross-examination).
6. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (establishing the
presumption of innocence of persons accused of crimes).
7. See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 4 (1996), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/
dnaevid.pdf (“Perhaps the most significant advance in criminal investigation
since the advent of fingerprint identification is the use of DNA technology to help
convict criminals or eliminate persons as suspects.”).
8. See id. at 12 (explaining that forensic evidence used in convictions is
usually used in rapes, sometimes resulting in murder, due to the nature of the
crime).
9. See Harris, supra note 3, at 469 (“Despite the constitutional requirement
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highly technical nature of this evidence creates a presumption of
guilt if the defendant is unable to impeach the prosecution’s
evidence with his or her own expert. 10 Yet, indigent defendants
that meet certain criteria are permitted experts. The Ake v.
Oklahoma “basic tools” principle, helps defendants to provide a
defense by supplying them with expert aid. 11 That being said,
thousands of defendants are convicted based on scientific evidence
every year without being afforded an expert to help prepare his or
her defense. 12 Additionally, a recent trend in exonerations has seen
that a significant portion of these conditions are based on improper
evidence. 13
While defendants unable to afford expert witnesses, including
forensic experts, are facially allowed to request one provided by the
state, the high level of showing required by the defendant
effectively destroys this right. 14 By effectively denying defendants
the means to refute technical evidence presented against them, the
current criminal trial process effectively creates a presumption of
guilt. 15 This trend is especially apparent in Virginia, where
defendants have been systematically denied forensic experts in
rape and murder cases where there is any witness or testimonial
that the state supply indigent defendants with counsel, other resources critical to
a defense—the services of investigators, scientists and other experts—remain
luxuries for indigent defendants.”).
10. See Alice B. Lustere, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for
Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.
5th 453 (2004) (explaining how separate states have developed systems for judges
to act as gatekeepers in determining whether DNA evidence is more prejudicial
than probative).
11. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (“[F]undamental fairness
entitles indigent defendants to ‘an adequate opportunity to present their claims
fairly within the adversary system’ . . . . we have focused on identifying the ‘basic
tools of an adequate defense or appeal,’ and . . . have required that such tools be
provided to . . . defendants who cannot afford to pay for them”) (internal citations
omitted).
12. See JOSEPH PETERSON ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE ROLE AND
IMPACT OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 1 (2006),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231977.pdf (analyzing the impact of
forensic evidence on criminal convictions).
13. Id.
14. See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance
in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1363 (2004) (“If
the [Ake] standard is too demanding, the right is gutted.”).
15. Id.
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evidence brought against them in addition to the forensic
evidence. 16 The standard in Virginia stems from the ambiguity of
Ake and the Supreme Court’s subsequent case law heightening the
standard within the state. 17
II. Background
A. Forensic Evidence and Convictions
Forensic evidence is evidence that is considered scientific in
nature and is provided to the court during trial to create a record. 18
Forensic evidence is different from eye witness testimony evidence
or confessions from defendants in that it is often provided to the
court by an expert witness, usually a scientist. 19 Forensic evidence
used in convictions has increased in the past twenty years, and this
is due to the advances in science, especially in DNA analyses. 20 In
the late 1980s, courts in the United States began using
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) as forensic evidence to convict
suspects in criminal trials. 21 The use of broad forensic evidence,
particularly DNA evidence, heralded a new era of convictions
where forensic evidence was more commonly used to convict, even
going so far as to be the only evidence against a defendant. 22
16. See, e.g., Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 928–29 (Va. 1996)
(denying the indigent defendant accused of rape a DNA expert at the
Commonwealth’s expense because the defendant failed to show a particularized
need since he confessed to the crime).
17. See id. at 924 (“The indigent defendant who seeks the appointment of an
expert must show a particularized need.”).
18. See COLIN AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF
EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 1–3 (2004) (explaining that forensic evidence
is evidence that is “transfer” or “trace” evidence that is brought by the criminal to
the crime and can be traced back to the criminal using various scientific methods).
19. Id.
20. See CONNORS ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (highlighting how the increased
use of DNA has helped convict the guilty and exonerate the innocent).
21. Id; see also id. at 1 (explaining how the use of DNA has led to a higher
rate of accuracy in identifying criminal defendants).
22. See Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone is
Enough to Convict, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 1131–33 (2010) (discussing how
statistics and probability have allowed juries to convict defendants solely using
DNA evidence that is less than a perfect match of the defendant’s DNA, but is so
close that it is a significant individualized showing).
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Defendants could be convicted based on DNA analyses of saliva,
blood, hair, skin tissue, and semen. 23 These advances in scientific
techniques allowed states and the federal government to connect
criminals to their crimes, usually in the context of rapes and
murders, in ways not before possible. 24 Forensic evidence also
became useful by allowing government investigators to exclude
suspects whose DNA did not match. 25 In total, forty-six states and
the federal government currently allow DNA as admissible
evidence. 26
Forensic evidence—including hair microscopy, bite mark
comparisons, firearm tool mark analysis, and shoe print
comparisons—is highly technical and cannot be admitted without
an expert witness. 27
Forensic evidence, and all scientific evidence for that matter,
presented in Court must meet the Daubert Standard, which was
created by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. 28
In Daubert the Supreme Court determined that contrary to prior
case precedent, a “general acceptance” of scientific standards is not
a necessary precondition to admitting scientific evidence under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 29 The Supreme Court created a flexible
standard for judges to assess the admissibility of scientific
evidence by looking at the “potential rate of error” and “existence
and maintenance of standards controlling the techniques

23. See CONNORS ET AL., supra note 7, at 4 (listing evidence that could be
traced back to criminals either through DNA or other scientific methods).
24. See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 7 (acknowledging that in most
crimes there is no forensic evidence, but due to the nature of rape and murder,
there are often traces of the criminal at the crime scene).
25. Id.
26. See CONNORS ET AL., supra note 7, at 7 (showing which states allow DNA
as admissible evidence).
27. See id. at 6 (“The state of the profiling technology and the methods for
estimating frequencies and related statistics have progressed to the point where
the admissibility of properly collected and analyzed DNA data should not be in
doubt.”).
28. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (“Unlike
an ordinary witness, see Rule 701, an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer
opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or
observation.”).
29. See id. at 587 (determining that “general acceptance” standard was
superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence).
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operation[.]”. 30 Upon admission of scientific evidence, the opposing
side’s cross examination and precise instruction on the burden of
proof are the two means to attack shaky evidence. 31
Courts have acknowledged that forensic evidence is
questionably accurate as the results of forensic testing and
analyses are often based on probability. 32 It is the state and the
federal governments that will most often present forensic and DNA
evidence at trial. 33 Courts have allowed defendants to challenge
expert witnesses and the tests used during cross examination, but
this adversarial technique to divulge truth and accuracy is not
always useful to the defendant if the defendant does not have the
means to hire their own forensic expert to challenge the
government’s expert testimony and DNA evidence. 34

30. See id. at 592 (allowing the judge to make a finding about the
admissibility of scientific evidence that can be challenged on cross examination).
31. Id. at 596.
32. See generally Andrea Roth, Denying DNA: Rethinking the Role of the
Jury in the Age of Scientific Proof and Innocence, 93 B.U.L. REV. 1643 (2013); see
also Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/unvalidated-or-improper-forensicscience/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2016) (“Unlike DNA testing, many forensic
disciplines . . . were developed solely to solve crime. These disciplines have
evolved primarily through their use in individual cases. Without the benefit of
sufficient foundational research or adequate financial resources, applied research
has also been minimal”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
33. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufield, Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (exploring forensic
science testimony by prosecution experts in the trials of innocent persons all
convicted of serious crimes).
34. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th
Dist. 1988) (“In contrast to evidence derived from hypnosis, truth serum and
polygraph, evidence derived from DNA print identification appears based on
proven scientific principles. Indeed, there was testimony that such evidence has
been used to exonerate those suspected of criminal activity.”); see also State v.
Woodall, 182 W. Va. 15, 23 (W. Va. 1989) (allowing that “[b]lood type and enzyme
tests have general scientific acceptance, and the distribution of particular blood
traits in the population is ascertainable,” and that the defendant has the
opportunity to impeach such forensic tests through cross examination of the
expert witness); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775, 783 (Va. 1989)
(“[U]ndisputed evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that DNA testing is
a reliable scientific technique and that the tests performed in the present case
were properly conducted, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting this
evidence.”).
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The flaws in the adversarial system when it comes to forensic
evidence can be seen in the wave of exonerations that began in
1989. 35 According to the Innocence Project, there have been more
than 333 post-conviction exonerations in the United States since
1989. 36 In a bulk of these convictions the jury or judge relied on
forensic evidence that misstated or was unsupported by empirical
data. 37
In each case where forensic evidence and testimony were
presented against the defendant, the defendant was protected by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which afford the defendant
the due process of law. 38 Due process governs a defendant’s right
to cross examine the witnesses, but this is not any use without the
help of an expert witness due to the technical nature of the
evidence. 39 Since the evidence is scientific in nature and indigent
defendants often lack the means to hire an expert witness, the
practical effect of forensic evidence is that the prosecution has
highly prejudicial evidence and the defendant lacks the means to
counter either the probative or prejudicial value of the evidence. 40
Though defendants have had the right to ask the state to provide
an independent expert witness for them since 1985, it has not
changed the convictions based on improper forensic evidence. 41
There are several systemic and policy breakdowns in the chain
of determining guilt. A major failure of the system is inherent to
the adversarial nature of criminal procedure when forensic
evidence is presented against indigent defendants who are unable
35. Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science, supra note 32.
36. Id.
37. See Garrett & Neufield, supra note 33 (indicating that scientific
identifiers of defendants were being misused).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
39. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1985) (explaining that due
process provides for “meaningful access to justice.”); see also NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 204 (1996) [hereinafter
NRC II] (explaining that because the National Research Council recognized the
potential of misuse of DNA evidence from the jurors’ perspective, it recommended
a study to reduce the prejudicial nature of DNA evidence).
40. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 70 (finding that an indigent defendant was entitled
to a psychiatrist as an expert as a matter of due process during the defendant’s
capital sentencing); see also NRC II, supra note 39 (explaining the scientific
nature of DNA evidence).
41. See generally Roth, supra note 22.
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to afford the means to fight such evidence. 42 The guarantee of
expert witnesses to indigent defendants, and the failure to deliver
on that guarantee, is a denial of these defendants’ Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
B. Indigent’s Right to Expert Witnesses
Indigent defendants occupy a vulnerable position in both state
and federal criminal justice systems. Though the Constitution
grants defendants broad rights, many of these rights are useless
unless the defendant has the means or the knowledge to actually
implement them. 43 As was determined by the Supreme Court in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 44 an indigent defendant, like a laydefendant, lacks the knowledge of how to procedurally assert his
or her rights at trial, without the effective assistance of counsel. 45
The Supreme Court therefore held that federal and state
governments are both required to provide an attorney to those who
lack the means to hire their own. 46 The right to an attorney for an
indigent defendant is required under the Sixth and Fifth
Amendments because an attorney is necessary in unlocking many
other rights at trial, and defending against the state who is
provided with attorneys of its own. 47
Along the same lines as the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,
the Supreme Court decided in Ake v. Oklahoma that an indigent
42. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (“[A] criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the
State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has
access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense.”).
43. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science
of law. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one.”).
44. See id. (holding that an indigent defendant in a criminal trial has a right
to be represented by counsel under the Sixth Amendment).
45. Id. at 345.
46. See id. at 344 (“[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”).
47. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 70 (1985) (acknowledging that the
federal and state constitutions create procedural and substantive safeguards so
that all defendants are created equal before the law, and the indigent require
state provided attorneys in order to ensure this equality).
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defendant is entitled to an expert witness if he or she can make a
proper showing to the government. 48 In Ake, the defendant was
denied a psychiatric expert witness provided by the government. 49
The defendant had been charged with the murder of a couple and
of injuring their two children. 50 The defendant informed the court
that he would be presenting the defense of insanity, and requested
that the state provide an expert witness: a court appointed
psychiatrist. 51 The court denied Ake’s request, and Ake’s sole
defense during the trial was insanity, but no expert witness was
brought forward to provide the psychiatric evidence needed. 52 Ake
was convicted, which he appealed. 53
The Supreme Court determined that Ake’s insanity defense
was a significant factor in both the guilt and sentencing phases of
the trial, and that according to due process a defendant should be
afforded “basic tools” necessary to present a defense. 54 The
Supreme Court held that when a defendant in a criminal
prosecution makes a preliminary showing that his or her defense,
such as insanity at the time of the offense, is likely to be a
significant factor at trial the Constitution requires that the state
provide the defendant access to a psychiatrist if the defendant
cannot otherwise afford one. 55
In Ake the Supreme Court provided defendants with a narrow
right, but one that is invaluable, especially as science has pushed
evidence to new levels. 56 While Ake did not allow for defendants to
48. See id. at 69 (listing factors considered for witness entitlement, such as
private interest affected by the action of the state, government interest if the
safeguard is provided, and the probable value of these safeguards and the risk or
erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if safeguards are not provided).
49. Id. at 68.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id. (explaining that the trial court denied a psychiatric witness that
the petitioner requested to support his insanity defense).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 77.
55. See id. at 85 (acknowledging a trend to recognized elemental
constitutional rights such as the right of an indigent defendant to attain a fair
hearing and access to the judicial process).
56. See id. at 86 (granting indigent defendants the right to make a showing
that they need an expert witness to prepare a defense that will be “a significant
factor” in his or her trial).

500

23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 491 (2017)

request any expert witness be provided by the state, it did set an
important guide that federal appellate and state courts have
expanded. 57 Additionally, it should be noted that in Caldwell v.
Mississippi 58 the Supreme Court refused to reverse the trial court’s
decision not to appoint two non-psychiatric witnesses, which
subsequent courts have called the “significant factor” standard and
has been read together with the Ake standard to create a new
standard. 59 Several subsequent cases, including some Supreme
Court dicta, have shown that an indigent defendant’s right to due
process includes a right to an expert witness if he or she is able to
show that they wish to provide a defense and need an expert to
construct it, which is both costly but shows the prosecution the
defendant’s case. 60
Currently the rights in Ake have mostly been codified, both at
the federal and the state level. 61 Because the Supreme Court has
left the scope of Ake undefined, there are significant disparities in
what rights indigents have under Ake depending on which court
hears the case. 62 Some courts have attempted to limit an indigent’s
rights under Ake only regarding the right to a psychiatrist, while
other courts have attempted to limit the case only to capital
cases. 63 The major trend has been to incorporate the principle in
Ake into criminal statutes; many courts have adopted a procedural
showing that a defendant must perform in order to be granted an
expert provided by the government. 64 Because the showing
57. See Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1316 (showing how Daubert and its
progeny expanded the use of expert witnesses, which created the need for the
states and federal government to provide non-psychiatric expert witnesses to
indigents).
58. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
59. See id. at 323 (determining that the petitioner’s circumstance do not
warrant the appointment of a non-psychiatric expert witness by the court, but
does not state that the court could not do so for an indigent in different
circumstances); see also Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925–26 (Va.
1996) (articulating the “significant factor” standard as applied to an indigent
defendant who seeks an expert in his or her defense).
60. Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1364.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 1365 (listing the various constructions of the tests within the
federal circuits).
63. Id. at 1364.
64. See id. at 1338 (explaining how usually an indigent’s right to an expert
witness is codified in state criminal statutes, but also acknowledging that these
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depends on the type of defense the defendant intends to present,
the type of expert is determined by the type of evidence that needs
to be analyzed. 65
C. State’s Access to Expert Witnesses
Paul C. Giannelli, in Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to
Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, puts forth
several compelling policy arguments as to why the Supreme Court
and states have developed an indigent’s rights to expert witnesses
under Ake. 66 Giannelli argues that states and the federal
government have access to expert witnesses, which are sometimes
even institutionalized, such as state funded forensic labs. 67 These
expert witnesses are often in the government’s employment. 68
Giannelli explains that when the government brings forward
technical evidence, the courts and defendants lack the expertise to
be able to properly challenge evidence. 69 Additionally, in some
cases government expert witnesses are thought to be biased, so
that the government has come to expect certain results from
forensic or DNA tests provided to a particular expert. 70

provisions widely differ as to what type of services are available, and what the
cost cap or reimbursement for services should entail).
65. See id. at 1367–68 (describing the types of expertise Ake has been extend
to, including toxicologists, pathologists, fingerprint experts, hypnotists, DNA
analysts, serologists, ballistics experts, handwriting examiners, blood spatter
specialists, forensic dentists for bite-mark comparisons, and psychologists on the
battered wife syndrome).
66. See generally id.
67. See id. at 1327 (explaining that there are over three hundred crime
laboratories in the country, and state prosecutors have access to labs at the state,
county, regional, and metropolitan levels, while federal prosecutors have access
to several top labs including the FBI and the DEA labs).
68. See id. at 1328 (showing that state and federal prosecutors can hire
independent labs as well as use the labs in the state employment, which include
such experts as local coroners); see generally Garrett & Neufield, supra note 33.
69. See id. (indicating that the Courts and defendants lack the technical and
scientific sophistication to challenge the Prosecution’s evidence).
70. See id. at 1390 (showing how the West Virginia Police Crime Laboratory
was caught using techniques to achieve improper results, and that even after the
improper actor moved to another state West Virginia prosecutors would send
evidence to him).
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There is ample evidence of forensic scientists working with
state prosecutors to achieve the prosecution’s ends, which is
usually the conviction of an indigent lay person unable to mount a
cogent defense. 71 Some of the more obvious cases of experts
presenting unchallenged testimony with a certainty that they did
not possess include state police laboratory scientist Joyce
Gilchrist. 72 Gilchrist testified and performed DNA examinations in
roughly three thousand cases in Oklahoma City. 73 Former
Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating opened an investigation when
post-conviction FBI evidence directly contradicted Gilchrist’s
evidence. 74 The state investigators found that Gilchrist had
misidentified evidence or given improper courtroom testimony in
several cases where the defendant had been convicted, which was
disconcerting considering that eight of those cases were capital
cases. 75
Similarly, forensic scientist Arnold Melnikoff worked for state
forensic labs in both Washington and Montana. 76 The FBI later
discovered that his testimony was entirely fabricated in a rape
trial, and the federal government urged Montana to reexamine
every case in which Melnikoff had presented testimony. 77 The
governor of Montana refused because Melnikoff had not said that
the DNA evidence did not show it was the defendant “exclusively”;
Melnikoff had said it was only a sixty percent chance, and
therefore there was little evidence of misconduct. 78 Washington
was forced to investigate over one hundred cases where Melnikoff
had presented evidence. 79
71.
72.

Id. at 1318.
Jim Yardley, Inquiry Focuses on Scientist Employed by Prosecutors, N.Y.
TIMES (May 2, 2009), https://nyti.ms/2jEh5RG (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Adam Liptak, Two States to Review Lab Work of Expert Who Erred on
ID, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2002), https://nyti.ms/2jEeAyA (last visited Apr. 19,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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In the Houston Police Department’s Crime Laboratory it was
not a rogue forensic scientist who wanted to help prosecutors; the
problems were more systemic. 80 There was evidence of poor record
keeping, improper procedures, and a lack of maintenance of
equipment. 81 The audit found this disconcerting as the lab had
presented testimony in several rape and murder trials that they
assured the court were precise matches to the defendants on
trial. 82 The doubt raised by the audit led the Texas Attorney
General’s office to investigate all the cases from the previous year
where the lab had provided evidence. 83 Later, the DNA and
toxicology labs were shut down and a lead detective was shot in his
cubicle, it was implied that the wound was self-inflicted. 84 An audit
of every case where the lab had provided evidence was conducted. 85
The concerns over impartiality, ineffective labs and
procedures, and the lack of expertise outside of the government’s
prosecution have led to courts expanding Ake to beyond just the
right to expert witnesses for psychiatric purposes, especially in the
context of forensic and DNA evidence. 86
D. DNA Alone to Convict
In a few cases, state and federal courts have found that DNA
alone is sufficient to convict without corroborating evidence, but
this is currently the exception rather than the rule. 87 DNA
80. Nick Madigan, Houston's Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2003), https://nyti.ms/2k5T1nH (last visited Apr. 19,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Ralph Blumenthal, Double Blow, One Fatal, Strikes Police In
Houston, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2003), https://nyti.ms/2k5HsN9 (last visited Apr.
19, 2017) (elucidating the issues facing the Houston police and their forensic labs)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964) (“Representation under each plan shall
include counsel and investigative, expert, and other services necessary for
adequate representation.”).
87. See generally People v. Rush, 242 A.D.2d 108, 109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d
Dep’t 1998).
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evidence and the standards of proof are a contentious subject,
especially because DNA evidence appears infallible, and even
when the court or jury is warned otherwise the evidence itself is
often enough to impute some level of guilt. 88 One of the more
extreme examples where DNA alone was enough to convict was
People v. Rush, where an FBI agent testified that the probability
of selecting another individual at random from the population with
the same DNA profile was 1 in 500 million. 89 The court held that
this was sufficient to make a finding of guilt. 90
Scholars find the lack of corroborating evidence in these “cold
hit” cases, where DNA evidence is the only evidence presented, to
be disturbing. 91 The lack of protocols, standardized practices,
quality control, and the possibility of improper interpretation or
conscious guiding of inferences is dangerous. 92 Forensic experts
present DNA evidence using probabilities of a match to the
defendant. 93 Some scholars are concerned that the use of
probabilities inspire confidence in the jury that does not meet the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 94 Scholars acknowledge that
such safeguards include corroborating evidence, but also include
the defendant’s right to their own expert witnesses. 95

88. See Roth, supra note 22, at 1358 (explaining that the use of DNA
matching evidence makes it difficult for jurors to separate probability of
innocence or guilt from certainty).
89. Id.
90. See Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
(“Giving due deference to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the verdict [based
only on a DNA match] is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence
as to be clearly wrong and unjust[.]”); Katharine C. Lester, Note, The Affects of
Apprendi v. New Jersey on the Use of DNA Evidence at Sentencing—Can DNA
Alone Convict of Unadjudicated Prior Acts?, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC.
JUST. 267, 288 (2010) (“Nonetheless, the trial court placed ‘unfettered faith in the
reliability of DNA evidence.”); see also State v. Toomes, 191 S.W.3d 122, 131
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (finding that DNA evidence, without corroborating
evidence, was sufficient to support conviction).
91. See Roth, supra note 22, at 1138–39 (showing that relying on cold hits
alone is risky without corroborating evidence due to the risk of probable matches).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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III. Ake Leads to Disparity
A. Federal Interpretation
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 provides expert assistance
for indigents in federal trials, thus codifying Ake at the federal
level. 96 The problem with this codification is that federal circuits
vary when it comes to the standard for appointing an expert
witness in an indigent’s trial. 97 The Fifth Circuit determined that
“where the government’s case rests heavily on a theory most
competently addressed by expert testimony, an indigent defendant
must be afforded the opportunity to prepare and present his
defense to such a theory with the assistance of his own expert
pursuant to section 3006A(e)[.]” 98 Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the
Ninth Circuit requires expert services when “a reasonable attorney
would engage such services for a client having the independent
financial means to pay for them[.]” 99 This “‘private attorney’
standard for determining necessity is based on the equal protection
rationale.” 100 In addition, the “relative strictness of the standard is
sometimes difficult to discern” not only because the language of
Ake is already ambiguous, but also because it is often read together
with other subsequent case law that might or might not be dicta. 101
The First Circuit requires that the proffered expert testimony be
“pivotal” or “critical” to the defense. 102 In contrast to this stringent
test, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the trial court may reject
an application for appointment if the accused “does not have a
plausible claim or defense[.]” 103 The Eleventh Circuit’s
interpretation is a much less demanding test for the indigent to

96. See Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1332 (indicating that indigent
defendants in Federal Court will be provided with their own expert witnesses if
they meet the necessary standard).
97. Id. at 1336.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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meet. 104 The differences across the federal districts illustrate the
lack of guidance from the Ake standard.
B. Virginia’s Interpretation
This confusion stemming from the Ake standard has been seen
in state courts as well. 105 This has been especially true in Virginia.
Virginia has not adopted a codified recognition of Ake in its
criminal statutes, but instead relies solely on case law. 106 Husske
v. Commonwealth is Virginia’s seminal case on an indigent’s rights
to an expert witness. 107 Criticized by many, the case grants
indigent defendants in the Commonwealth the opportunity to
make an Ake showing about the necessity of an expert witness to
develop a defense that will be a significant factor in their trial. 108
However, an indigent defendant’s right to an expert witness is not
an explicit Constitutional right. 109 The Supreme Court in Virginia
interprets Ake interestingly; it reads reading Ake with Caldwell to
create a level of showing not explained in either case. 110 As
mentioned before, Caldwell was a Supreme Court case with a
footnote that seemed to establish a “significant factor” showing for
granting the appointment of an indigent defendant. 111 Caldwell
104. Id.
105. See id. at 1338–39 (showing how state criminal statutes or rulings
providing an expert witness to a defendant vary widely).
106. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-332 (allowing compensation for counsel or
expert witnesses for indigent witnesses not mandated).
107. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 924 (Va. 1996) (“The
Commonwealth asserts that the defendant has no constitutional right under the
Due Process or Equal Protection clauses for the appointment, at the
Commonwealth’s expense, of a DNA expert.”).
108. Id.
109. See id. at 925 (explaining that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution
merely requires, “an adequate opportunity [for defendant] to present [his] claims
fairly within the adversary system.”).
110. See id. (“We are of opinion that Ake and Caldwell, when read together,
require that the Commonwealth of Virginia, upon request, provide indigent
defendants with ‘the basic tools of an adequate defense,’ and, that in certain
instances, these basic tools may include the appointment of non-psychiatric
experts”) (internal citations omitted).
111. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985) (“But petitioner
also requested appointment of a criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert, and
a ballistics expert, and those requests were denied. The State Supreme Court
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was a capital murder case that dealt primarily with appellate
review, but the Supreme Court mentioned in a footnote that the
trial court did not err in not appointing a state funded ballistics
expert. 112 The trial court had provided the defendant a psychiatric
expert. 113 The Supreme Court stated “[g]iven that petitioner
offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested
assistance would be beneficial, we find no deprivation of due
process in the trial judge’s decision [to deny.]” 114 The Supreme
Court of Virginia determined that indigent defendants must make
a showing of a “particularized need,” much like the “significant
factor” showing in Ake. 115 Unlike the Supreme Court in Ake,
Virginia’s particularized need showing incorporates a
reasonableness element from Caldwell. 116 The reasonableness and
significant factor requirements allow a court to determine the case
as a whole, and the relevance of the evidence that the defendant
has requested an expert to develop. 117
Virginia’s interpretation of Ake and Caldwell, especially
including the reasonableness element, has created such a high
standard that indigent defendants have rarely been able to meet
it. 118 As subsequent Virginia case law has shown, indigent
defendants are usually denied the right to an expert witness,
especially a forensic expert in rape and murder cases, unless DNA
evidence is the only type of evidence presented against them. 119
affirmed the denials because the requests were accompanied by no showing as to
their reasonableness.”).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925–26 (Va. 1996)
(explaining that a particularized need analysis includes looking and the
probability of impact on the outcome of the trial, as well as the cost of the expert
witness).
116. Id.
117. See id. at 211 (“[A]n indigent defendant may satisfy this burden by
demonstrating that the services of an expert would materially assist him in the
preparation of his defense and that the denial of such services would result in a
fundamentally unfair trial”) (citing State v. Mills, 420 S.E.2d 114, 117 (N.C.
1992)).
118. See Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1366 (analyzing the disparity between
prosecution and defense resources, especially for indigent defendants).
119. See generally Branche v. Commonwealth, No. 0912-05-2, 2006 WL
1222400 (Va. Ct. App. May 9, 2006).
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This is a departure from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of due
process, yet its vague ruling in Ake has essentially destroyed the
right that it intended to create. 120 Virginia has created a more
stringent standard than the “basic tools” standard from Ake by
adding an element of reasonableness from the footnotes of
Caldwell. 121 Additionally, Virginia’s particularized need exception
to an indigent defendant’s right to an expert witness is inherently
flawed, in that a defendant will not be able to show the
particularized need for the expert witness because the very reason
they need the witness is to produce the evidence that would be the
substance of the particularized need.
IV. Virginia’s Standard Applied
A. Standard Not Met
Virginia has not strayed away from the particularized need
that the Virginia Supreme Court established in Husske v.
Commonwealth. 122 In many cases Virginia has provided expert
witnesses to indigent defendants charged with murder or rape and
the state only provided DNA or forensic evidence to convict. 123
Virginia courts have established the particularized need rule from
Husske, but in many cases Virginia seems to only grant indigent
defendants expert witnesses in murder and rape cases where the
particularized need is that the prosecutors’ only evidence against
the defendant is DNA forensic in nature. 124 Virginia courts seem
120. See generally Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 73 (1985).
121. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985) (“But petitioner
also requested appointment of a criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert, and
a ballistics expert, and those requests were denied. The State Supreme Court
affirmed the denials because the requests were accompanied by no showing as to
their reasonableness.”).
122. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925–26 (Va. 1996)
(crafting the particularized need standard); Branche v. Commonwealth, No. 091205-2, 2006 WL 1222400, at *3 (utilizing the particularized need standard);
Juniper v. Commonwealth, 626 S.E.2d 383, 393 (Va. 2006) (deciding that the
defendant had not met the particularized need standard).
123. See generally Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 2013);
Dowdy v. Commonwealth, 686 S.E.2d 710 (Va. 2009).
124. See Husske, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (detailing that “[t]he indigent defendant
who seeks the appointment of an expert must show a particularized need”); see
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to determine that a defendant has a particularized need when the
prosecutor is relying solely on DNA or forensic evidence, against
which a defendant would not be able to present a successful
defense without any help from a DNA expert. 125 In such cases the
Commonwealth has given the defendant the means to hire an
expert witness to rebut the Commonwealth’s claims, but often even
the stipend the defendant is given to hire an independent expert
witness is not enough to properly rebut the Commonwealth’s
claims. 126
The Supreme Court of Virginia has created a standard that
combined elements from Ake and Caldwell to create a standard
that is more stringent than either standard used by itself. 127 The
practical effect is that indigent defendants must meet a standard
that the Virginia Supreme Court created using two already
ambiguous standards from separate cases with materially
distinguishable facts. 128
The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that a defendant
who wants to have the Commonwealth provide an expert witness
must show a particularized need so that the Commonwealth does
not waste time and resources on every defendant asking for an
expert. 129 In order to demonstrate a particularized need, the
defendant must show that there is relevant evidence requiring an
impartial expert qualified to bring the evidence to trial. 130 An
unacknowledged trend in Virginia is that Courts will refuse expert
witnesses—particularly DNA and forensic analysts—if there is
evidence other than DNA and forensics that indicate a defendant’s
also Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 396 (Va. 2011) (“The only physical
evidence linking Angel to the crime . . . was the DNA evidence.”).
125. See generally Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d; Dowdy, 686 S.E.2d.
126. Id.
127. See Husske, 476 S.E.2d at 925–26 (showing that Virginia has departed
from the basic tools principles of Ake and has created a heightened standard of
“particularized need” (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1
(1985))).
128. See Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1364 (discussing the difficulties indigent
defendants face when trying to secure expert witnesses).
129. Id.
130. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 926 (Va. 1996) (“As we
previously stated, an indigent defendant who seeks the appointment of an expert,
at the Commonwealth’s expense, must show a particularized need for such
services and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.”).
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guilt. 131 In effect, Virginia’s heightened standard creates a more
difficult showing than that which the Supreme Court required in
Ake, which means that the particularized need showing violates a
defendant’s “basic tools of an adequate defense[.]” 132
Husske first established this heightened standard. Husske,
the defendant, was arrested on “peeping tom” charges and taken
to a Henrico County Mental Health and Retardation Services
office. 133 The woman he was observing had been raped a few
months earlier, but the assailant had fled. 134 While at the facility
with his wife, the facility staff asked Husske if he had been
involved in rape in addition to the voyeurism. 135 Husske denied
being involved in a rape, but after his wife left the room and he
was questioned further Husske stated that even though this was
his first arrest on such a charge, he had been engaging in this
behavior for 20 years and had gone “one step further.” 136 Husske
was convicted of the “peeping tom” charges. 137 After an attempted
suicide and while he was serving time Husske confessed to Dr.
Elwood that he had completed a rape at the facility where he was
caught peeping a few months earlier. 138 Husske described some
elements of the victim’s initial rape, but some elements that
differed. 139
The court declared Husske indigent when brought to trial, and
his counsel moved prior to and at trial that the Commonwealth
provide the defendant an expert witness for the DNA and forensic
evidence that would be presented by the prosecution. 140 Instead
131. See id. at 922–24 (describing the defendant’s crimes and subsequent
confession); Branche v. Commonwealth, No. 0912-05-2, 2006 WL 1222400, at *1,
*8 (Va. Ct. App. May 9, 2006) (affirming the denial of an expert witness for a
defendant in a case where the defendant had stated the victim’s race before police
mentioned it).
132. See Husske, 476 S.E.2d 920, 929 (Poff, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
defendant had met the showing under Ake, but the majority requires a two-part
showing).
133. Id. at 922.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 923.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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the Commonwealth appointed a respected attorney co-counsel
because he was “the most knowledgeable member of the local bar
in the area of forensic DNA application[.]” 141 The Commonwealth
brought an employee of the Commonwealth’s Division of Forensic
Science, and a professor of statistics and genetics at North
Carolina State University to present the forensic DNA evidence
against Husske. 142
Husske was ultimately convicted of the rape, and on appeal
the Supreme Court of Virginia took the words “particularized
necessity” from the footnotes of the United States Supreme Court
case Caldwell in order to create the particularized need standard
in Virginia. 143 The Caldwell standard required that an indigent
defendant must show reasonableness when requesting a Court
appointed expert witness. 144 First, the Supreme Court of Virginia
determined that the defendant, Husske, made no showing of a
particularized need. 145 Husske had only asked for an expert
witness to address the Commonwealth’s DNA evidence. 146 He had
not shown how the evidence would factor into his defense at
trial. 147 Second, the Supreme Court of Virginia also determined
that even if Husske had shown that the expert testimony would
factor into his defense that it would not be a significant factor. 148
Husske had confessed to the rape, which meant that he would be
unable to show that he had been prejudiced because a
141. See id. at 924–25 (showing how the motion for an expert witness was
dismissed, but the lower court acknowledged the DNA evidence as relevant and
attempted to resolve the inequitable state of expertise by appointing an attorney
well-read on DNA as co-counsel).
142. Id. at 923–24.
143. See id. at 926 (“[T]he determination . . . whether a defendant has made
an adequate showing of particularized necessity lies within the discretion of the
trial judge.”).
144. Id. at 925.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 924–26 (demonstrating that the Supreme Court of Virginia
acknowledges both the “basic tools” and “significant factor” standards from Ake,
but uses the more obscure and less applicable “particularized necessity” language
from Caldwell).
148. See id. (illustrating that Husske would have failed the Ake standard of
showing that the evidence for which he needed the expert would be a significant
factor in his defense).
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particularized need to his defense would have to address both the
confession and the DNA evidence. 149
The Supreme Court of Virginia took the reasonableness
standard when appointing experts from Caldwell and combined it
with the Ake standard. 150 The Supreme Court of Virginia created
a new standard outside of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Ake by reading the
two standards of showing together. 151 The heightened standard
makes it difficult for indigent defendants in Virginia to
successfully motion for appointment of an expert witness. 152
Virginia Courts have tended to deny an indigent’s motion of
an expert witness where other evidence is presented outside of just
the DNA evidence. 153 In Angel v. Commonwealth154 an assailant in
149. See id. at 926 (“[H]e confessed to the crimes, and he described the details
of his offenses with great specificity.”).
150. See id. at 925. The Supreme Court of Virginia explained their reading of
Ake and Caldwell as follows:
We are of opinion that Ake and Caldwell, when read together, require
that the Commonwealth of Virginia, upon request, provide indigent
defendants with the basic tools of an adequate defense, and, that in
certain instances; these basic tools may include the appointment of
non-psychiatric experts. This Due Process requirement, however, does
not confer a right upon an indigent defendant to receive, at the
Commonwealth's expense, all assistance that a non-indigent defendant
may purchase. Rather, the Due Process clause merely requires that the
defendant may not be denied “an adequate opportunity to present [his]
claims fairly within the adversary system.”
Id.
151. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).
152. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 929 (Va. 1996) (Poff, R.,
dissenting) (criticizing the court’s adoption of a two-fold showing, especially when
the defendant had moved five separate times for an appointment of an expert
witness).
153. See infra text accompanying notes 156–211.
154. See Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 402 (Va. 2011) (affirming
the lower court). The Supreme Court of Virginia held that:
there was no reversible error in denying Angel’s motion to suppress his
custodial interrogation, in denying Angel’s appeal of the order of the
JDR court certifying the charges against him to the grand jury . . . in
denying his motion to dismiss the indictments, in denying his motion
for appointment and compensation for a DNA expert and denying his
motion for a continuance, in joining the trials of separate offenses and
admitting evidence of other crimes, and in denying Angel’s motion for
mistrial[, and] the imposition of life sentences without parole in this
case is not cruel and unusual.
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2006 committed a series of rapes and sexual assaults all within two
miles of the same location in Arlington, Virginia. 155 The victims
and witnesses told law enforcement that the assailant was a young
Hispanic man that escaped on a green motorbike. 156 The defendant
in the case was picked up by law enforcement in the same
geographical area that the assaults occurred, and he was walking
a green motorbike. 157 The defendant did not speak any English; he
was read his Miranda rights in Spanish and an interview was
conducted in Spanish. 158 The defendant was ultimately charged
and brought to trial. 159
The defendant made a motion to have an expert witness
analyze the DNA evidence produced against him, but the trial
court denied the motion. 160 The trial court reasoned that the other
circumstantial evidence, such as the witnesses, the bike, and the
geographical location, meant that under the Husske standard of
particularized need the defendant did not need an expert
witness. 161 According to the court, the Commonwealth did not need
to provide the defendant an expert witness for the prosecution’s
DNA evidence when it would be unreasonable; the court found that
it would be unreasonable considering the fact that the DNA would
likely play an insignificant part of the evidence presented against
the defendant. 162
Id.
155. See id. at 389–90 (explaining there was one brutal rape and a series of
attempted rapes all involving a Hispanic man with a green dirt bike).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 390.
158. Id. at 392.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 395 (describing how the trial court denied Angel’s pretrial
motion, which he renewed at trial, in addition to asking for a continuance, for an
expert to review the DNA evidence).
161. See id. (articulating the Husske standard, which “require[s] that the
Commonwealth of Virginia, upon request, provide indigent defendants with the
basic tools of an adequate defense, and, that in certain instances, these basic tools
may include the appointment of non-psychiatric experts” (quoting Husske v.
Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996))).
162. See id. at 396 (applying the Husske standard, the court must “determine
whether there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the evidence complained of by the
defendant ‘might have contributed to the conviction’” (quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967))). The Angel court found that, “[W]hile the DNA
evidence is the only physical evidence that linking Angel to V.L., the remaining
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On appeal, Angel had five major assignments of error, only
three of which are relevant to him being denied an expert
witness. 163 Angel’s first assignment of error was that his supposed
confession to the police was not a confession but a
misunderstanding. 164 Angel argued that he did not waive his
Miranda rights when he assented that he understood what the
officer was saying. 165 In addition, Angel argued that he simply
answered the officer’s questions in the affirmative, but he was
unable to understand the questions properly because he did not
speak English. 166 Second, Angel argued that because the
circumstantial witness evidence was aggregated due to the several
rape and sexual assault charges being joined, the jury was able to
look at evidence from each of the separate crimes together, which
made it seem that Angel was the perpetrator. 167 Finally, Angel also
argued that the DNA evidence used at trial was the only physical
evidence linking him to the crime, and the DNA evidence showed
a purportedly “very high” match to Angel, but it was not a clear
match. 168 Angel argued that the circumstantial evidence and
supposed confession were ambiguous evidence, and the
prosecution’s evidence was significantly strengthened by the
probative value of the DNA evidence, which Angel could not
contest with an expert. 169
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed Angel’s argument
about the appointment of an expert witness by admitting that
providing Angel an expert might have been appropriate. 170
evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the lack of the DNA evidence
would not have altered the verdict.” Id.
163. Id. at 391.
164. See id. at 392 (demonstrating how the language barrier had caused
confusion).
165. Id.
166. See id. (acknowledging that, in addition, Angel was seventeen, had a
ninth-grade education, hailed from El Salvador, “had been present in this country
for only six months,” and his parents were not present).
167. See id. at 397 (“Angel argues that the admission of proof relating to these
crimes was improper because the facts of the incidents were not nearly identical
to the crimes for which he was on trial in any distinctive aspect and the admission
of these crimes was more prejudicial than probative.”).
168. Id. at 396.
169. Id.
170. See id. (“The denial of this motion, if error, was harmless error based on
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However, the Supreme Court also stated that the error in denying
Angel’s motion to be appointed an expert witness was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. 171 The Supreme Court determined it
was a harmless error because the jury could have found that Angel
was the guilty party based on the remaining evidence outside of
the forensic DNA. 172
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s interpretation of an
indigent’s right to an expert witness seems flawed here. Angel
moved to be appointed an expert witness and was denied because
of an apparent lack of a particularized need, though DNA evidence
was the only physical evidence presented against him. 173 The
Court of Appeals “assumed without deciding” that Angel should
have been appointed an expert witness to assess the
Commonwealth’s DNA evidence; the Virginia Supreme Court
upheld the conviction by determining it to be a harmless error. 174
The Court’s reasoning is based on what Angel referred to as the
Commonwealth’s circumstantial evidence that was pieced together
only because the charges were brought against Angel jointly. 175
The Court did not address the prejudicial nature of the DNA
evidence, and how it made the circumstantial evidence look
concrete, and the confession look irrelevant. 176 In Angel, the
Supreme Court of Virginia reassured other trial courts that they
may deny indigents’ motions for DNA expert witnesses even

the remaining evidence of identity recited above.”).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 395.
174. Id. at 396.
175. See id. at 398 (“Angel argues that if the cases had not been joined ‘it is
less likely that the subsequent July 9 acts would have been permitted to be heard
by the [S.P.] jury.”). The Court found that:
[b]ased on this record, we agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion
that the admissible evidence constitutes “overwhelming evidence that
[Angel] was the perpetrator of the June 18 misdemeanor sexual battery
against S.P., and thus, any error in joining for trial that offense with
the offenses against V. L. was harmless on the issue of guilt or
innocence.”
Id.
176. Id.
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though it may be needed, if there is any other circumstantial
evidence available. 177
A case that focuses more on particularized need but shows
Virginia’s unwillingness to provide a forensic DNA expert
witnesses to indigent defendants is Branche v. Commonwealth. 178
In this case the defendant, Branche, was accused of assault and
rape. 179 The evidence in the Branche case consisted of the
testimony of the assailant and victim, Branche’s brief statement to
the police, and the DNA evidence collected at the crime scene. 180
Branche moved as an indigent defendant to have the
Commonwealth appoint an expert in forensic DNA evidence to help
with his defense. 181 The defendant was confused because there was
no DNA of a sexual nature. 182 The defendant argued for the
Commonwealth to appoint a forensic expert with the following
statement:
[The Report’s] conclusion is flawed and based on unreliable
scientific conclusions that will require expert assistance to
demonstrate. In particular defendant needs to employ experts
to conduct DNA testing and evaluation of the Commonwealth’s
evidence. Counsel certifies that if his client had sufficient funds,
he would routinely employ an expert in this matter. 183

Additionally, the defendant’s motion stated the following in order
to show the particularized need he had in presenting a defense:
“[The defendant requests] to have an expert review Dr. Eve Rossi’s
report, look it over with all supporting documents, and make sure
177. Id
178. See Branche v. Commonwealth, No. 0912-05-2, 2006 WL 1222400, at *4
(Va. Ct. App. May 9, 2006) (affirming the appellant’s convictions because
“appellant had such an opportunity and therefore was not denied due process . . .
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant . . . a DNA expert
at state expense.”).
179. Id. at *3.
180. Id. at *5.
181. See id. at *1 (indicating that the defendant made a written motion
asserting that his need for a DNA expert was “material in the preparation of his
defense and the denial of such would be prejudicial to his case and result in a
fundamentally unfair trial.”).
182. See id. (explaining that the DNA report showed analysis of perspiration,
blood and DNA left on a liquor bottle, but that there was no DNA of oral or vaginal
swabs matching the defendant or any third party).
183. Id.
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we have the right person, we have the right DNA, make sure it is
consistent[.]” 184
The Court of Appeals of Virginia determined that Branche’s
motion should be denied 185 The Court of Appeals of Virginia stated
that just because understanding the highly technical nature of
DNA is difficult, this does not give rise to a particularized need. 186
The court quoted Husske stating, “[a] hope or suspicion that
favorable evidence may be procured from an expert, however, is
not sufficient to require the appointment of an expert[.]” 187
Additionally, the court states that the motion made “generalized
statements” and “conclusory assertions.” 188 The court accepted the
prosecution’s argument that the DNA evidence was not to prove
that Branche had committed the rape, but that he had been in the
room, and the prosecution relied on the victim’s testimony to prove
the rape. 189 The Court of Appeals of Virginia added “an indigent
defendant is not constitutionally entitled, at the state’s expense, to
all the experts that a non-indigent defendant might afford[.]” 190
The Virginia courts took the opportunity to deny an indigent’s
motion for a DNA expert by showing that there was additional
evidence outside of the DNA to find the need was not
particularized. 191 The prosecution’s argument that the DNA was
only used to prove the defendant’s presence in the room was
effective in that the defendant cannot show enough of a
particularized need, or likelihood that the evidence would impact
the outcome of the case to show that he needed a DNA expert. 192
The DNA evidence was still prejudicial enough to place the
defendant in the room, and once the defendant was placed in the
184. Id. at *2.
185. Id. at *5.
186. See id. at *3 (stating that with regard to the defendant’s proffer, “‘his
generalized statements’ and ‘conclusory assertions’ did not show a particularized
need.”).
187. Id. at *3.
188. Id.
189. See id. at *4 (“[T]he Commonwealth sought to introduce incriminating
DNA evidence in this case only to prove appellant’s presence in the apartment,
not sexual contact.”).
190. See id. (“[A]n indigent defendant is not constitutionally entitled, at the
state’s expense, to all the experts that a non-indigent defendant might afford.”).
191. Id. at *3.
192. Id.
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room of the victim, the victim’s testimony was enough to establish
that the defendant was the rapist, essentially making the DNA
evidence the only evidence necessary to convict. 193
In a similar case, involving a car-jacking and murder, Sanchez
v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted based on two items
of evidence. 194 The first was an ambiguous description provided by
an eyewitness: the woman who was carjacked. 195 The reliability of
the eyewitness’s testimony was incomplete as she was only able to
identify one of her two attackers. 196 The other evidence the
prosecution brought against the defendant was DNA from blood
found on the inside driver’s side door of the car. 197
Prior to the trial the defendant motioned to have an expert
witness appointed to review the DNA evidence and go over the
findings. 198 The court granted the defendant’s motion agreeing
193. See id. (“[The defendant] cannot claim that alternate DNA results would
be essential to his defense, as he did not deny being in the apartment in the first
place. His strategy at trial was to provide an alternate explanation to the
evening’s events, not to dispute his presence and involvement.”).
194. See Sanchez v. Commonwealth, 585 S.E.2d 337, 345 (Va. Ct. App. 2003)
(finding that because the defendant demonstrated a particularized need, it was
error for the trial court to deny funds for an expert, and thus, the defendant’s
ability “to rebut and challenge the Commonwealth’s evidence” was frustrated).
195. See id. at 339 (demonstrating the inconsistencies found in this witness’
testimony). At trial, the witness stated:
At Sanchez’s preliminary hearing in March 2001, [the witness]
described the carjacking driver as approximately her height with a
Hispanic accent. She also identified Sanchez as the driver, although
she had earlier identified another individual as the driver while she
was at the courthouse for the preliminary hearing of Sanchez’s
codefendant in Spring 2000. [B]efore trial, the prosecutor told her that
[the defendant] confessed to the carjacking. She identified Sanchez as
the driver and further testified that both men who carjacked her car
had Hispanic accents. She described the driver as “[her] height or a
little bit taller,” with a goatee, and “fairly broad, Hispanic type
features, [and] a rough voice.” She also stated he was in his mid to late
twenties. [A] Police Officer . . . testified that [the witness] described the
driver on the date of the carjacking, as Hispanic, between 5’4” and 5’6”
in height, with a moustache. [The witness], who is 5’3” in height,
conceded at trial that she might have earlier told a police officer that
the driver was 5’6” tall and she did not recall saying that he had a
moustache.
Id.
196. Id. at 340.
197. Id. at 345.
198. See id. at 340 (stating that the defendant made the motion “to evaluate
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that there was a particularized need. 199 The defendant made a
pretrial motion for additional funds to have the expert witness
testify at trial, as the previous funds had been exhausted in having
the expert analyze the data. 200 The court denied the motion for
additional funds and the defendant was subsequently convicted. 201
The defendant argued that denying the motion had been
erroneous and stated, “[the expert] has noticed that there were
errors in the way that the DNA procedures were followed, that
there were errors in the way the examination was done, which
could have had a significant impact in the results of the DNA[.]” 202
Again, similar to Angel, the Court of Appeals determined that the
denial of additional funds by the trial court was erroneous. 203 The
DNA evidence was the only physical evidence linking the
defendant to the crime. 204 Additionally, the proffer that the
defendant’s DNA expert had found evidence that the tests
performed by the Commonwealth contained errors was likely to
impact the outcome of the case. 205
Regardless of the erroneous deprivation of the funds to hire
the expert witness to testify at trial, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia determined that the error was harmless and the
additional evidence from the eyewitness was sufficient in
conjunction with the DNA evidence to convict the defendant. 206
the Commonwealth’s DNA evidence and the processes by which it was
developed.”).
199. See id. (granting the defendant $3,000 for such an expert).
200. See id. at 340 (establishing that Sanchez had been granted $3,000 to hire
an expert witness, but the witness charged $1,750, which meant that Sanchez did
not have enough to bring the expert witness to court to testify about the analysis
he had written up).
201. Id. at 340–41.
202. Id. at 340.
203. See id. at 342–43 (“Sanchez’s proffer demonstrated a particularized
need . . . . Sanchez’s ability to challenge the validity of the Commonwealth’s DNA
results was truncated by the trial court’s denial of the additional funds that
Sanchez sought.”).
204. Id. at 343.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 344 (finding harmless error in light of the evidence: his
confession, his description of “his actions on the date in question in detail . . .
corroborat[ion]” of a witness’ testimony, as well as the shoe impression on the
driver’s window).
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Virginia’s particularized need standard has created a
standard of showing that is more difficult to meet than is required
by the Supreme Court in Ake. 207 This creates a system where the
majority of indigent defendants granted expert DNA witnesses at
the trial will be defendants where the only evidence or only
material evidence brought against them is DNA or forensic.
B. Standard Met
While Virginia courts are likely to deny an indigent
defendant’s motion for a DNA expert witness for a defendant if
there is any evidence in addition to the DNA, the opposite is true
if the defendant is faced with only DNA evidence. 208 Two cases in
particular illustrate Virginia courts applying Ake and Husske to
indigent defendant cases, and in those cases the only evidence
presented against the defendants was DNA. 209 The first case is
Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 210 in which the defendant was charged
with capital murder subsequent to rape or attempted rape. 211 The
victim in the case was raped in her studio apartment and
subsequently beaten to death with a metal cooking pot found at the
scene of the crime. 212 The only physical evidence found at the crime
scene was DNA taken off of the victim’s body and off “the wooden
207. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 930 (Va. 1996) (Poff, J.,
dissenting) (discussing that the Ake rule only applies if “the defendant makes a
threshold showing that the assistance of an expert to confront the prosecution
will be a significant factor at trial.”). The Husske Court stated that the Ake rule
“require[s] a State to provide ‘the basic tools of an adequate defense’ . . . to those
defendants who cannot afford to pay for them.” See id. at 929 (quoting Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985)).
208. See Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 895 (Va. 2013) (affirming
that the defendant is guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death); Dowdy v.
Commonwealth, 686 S.E.2d 710, 724 (Va. 2009) (affirming the Court of Appeals
in “upholding Dowdy’s conviction for the rape and first-degree murder of Judy
Jaimie Coate.”).
209. See Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d at 859 (showing that only DNA evidence linked
the defendant to the crime and the trial court appointed an expert witness);
Dowdy, 686 S.E.2d at 720–21 (illustrating that only DNA evidence linked the
defendant to the crime and the trial court appointed an expert witness).
210. See generally Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d.
211. Id. at 859.
212. Id.
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pot handle, and the frying pan.” 213 The defendant, Lawlor, was a
lease consultant who lived in the victim’s building and had access
to each of the apartments. 214 Due to the victim’s unfortunate death,
at trial the only evidence that directly linked Lawlor to the crime
was the apparent DNA evidence that the Commonwealth
brought. 215
The defendant, Lawlor, motioned for funds for an expert
witness to be provided by the Commonwealth. 216 The defendant
requested an expert be funded to travel to Uruguay to collect DNA
evidence from the individual that Lawlor argued had actually
committed the rape, in order to refute the DNA evidence provided
by the Commonwealth. The first was an expert DNA analyst that
the defendant wanted to use to refute the DNA evidence brought
against him by the Commonwealth. 217 The second was a private
investigator to travel to Uruguay to collect DNA from the
individual that Lawlor argued had actually committed the rape
and murder. 218 The trial court granted Lawlor’s motion for a DNA
analyst but denied the motion for funds to hire the private
investigator. 219 The court cited Husske, saying “this Court noted
that an indigent defendant is not constitutionally entitled, at the
state’s expense, to all the experts that a non-indigent defendant
might afford[.]” 220 By citing Husske, the court explicitly illustrated
that it in fact employed the particularized need standard of
showing for an indigent defendant who requested funds for an
expert witness. 221
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 859–60.
216. See id. at 872–73 (demonstrating that Lawlor made a motion for funding
to “send an investigator to Uruguay” which he renewed on January 13, 2011).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 873 (“The court then ruled that Lawlor had a right to call
Delgado at trial and that it would provide funds to make Delgado available as a
defense witness. However, it denied the request for funds to send the investigator
to Uruguay.”).
220. See id. at 872 (stating that “an indigent defendant is not constitutionally
entitled, at the state’s expense, to all the experts that a non-indigent defendant
might afford”) (quoting Crawford v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 107, 115 (Va.
2011)).
221. See id. (“It is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate this ‘particularized
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Additionally, Lawlor made several subsequent funding
requests for the DNA expert as the DNA evidence became more
important. 222 The court repeatedly granted the requests until the
final request was for the analysis of single hair found in the
apartment that had been present for an indeterminate amount of
time. 223 Unlike Husske, Angel, Branche, or Sanchez, the only
evidence directly linking Lawlor to the rape and murder was the
DNA evidence, which meant that the court had to provide a DNA
expert in order to afford Lawlor the “basic tools” necessary to
preserve a fair trial. 224
A second case that illustrates the particularized need rule is
Dowdy v. Commonwealth. 225 Like Lawlor, Dowdy involves the
brutal rape and murder of a woman in Virginia. 226 The defendant,
like Lawlor, lived in close proximity to the victim and even
admitted to having intercourse with the victim a few days prior to
the rape and murder. 227 Also like Lawlor, because the unfortunate
victim had been murdered and there was little circumstantial
evidence beyond the fact that he had intercourse with the victim
previously, the only evidence linking the defendant to the crime
was the DNA evidence found on the victim’s body. 228
Also like Lawlor, Dowdy moved as an indigent to have the
funds to appoint an expert provided by Commonwealth. 229 Dowdy
wanted a private investigator hired to interview the victim’s
friends to better understand who she had been seen with that

need’ by establishing that an expert’s services would materially assist him in
preparing his defense and that the lack of such assistance would result in a
fundamentally unfair trial.”).
222. Id. at 873.
223. See id. at 874 (“‘The Defense has asked the Court to test virtually
everything that’s there . . . [without] any basis that would produce evidence of a
second participant. . . .”).
224. See id. (finding it was not an abuse of discretion when the court granted
the requests for DNA testing, “despite the fact that Lawlor admitted participating
in the murder and the overwhelming consistency of the forensic evidence,” and
denied a DNA test as to a hair fragment.).
225. 686 S.E.2d 710 (Va. 2009).
226. Id. at 712.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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day. 230 Also, Dowdy wanted the funds to hire an expert DNA
analyst to refute the Commonwealth’s DNA and forensic
evidence. 231 The Commonwealth had spermatozoa swabs, bloody
fingerprints, and hairs collected from the body. 232 The court denied
Dowdy’s motion for a private investigator, citing Husske and
arguing that Dowdy had not made a particularized enough
showing to warrant appointment of funds for a private
investigator. 233 However, the court did provide Dowdy with the
funds to hire an expert DNA and forensics analyst. 234
V. Problems
The differences between the Husske strain of cases, where
expert witnesses were denied, and the Dowdy and Lawlor strain of
cases, where expert witnesses were appointed, show that Virginia
court’s particularized need standard of showing can be met. The
distinguishable facts that would cause the differences in the
outcome between the two cases are the presence or absence of
evidence other than the DNA brought by the prosecution. In the
Husske strain of cases there was evidence, usually circumstantial,
in addition to the DNA evidence. 235 In the Dowdy and Lawlor
strain the evidence was only the DNA type evidence. 236 According
the Supreme Court of the United States in Ake the indigent
defendant must make a showing that an expert witness will be a
significant factor in his defense. 237 The Supreme Court of Virginia
determined in Husske that an indigent defendant must make a
showing that not only would an expert witness play a significant
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 714.
233. See id. at 712 (“[T]he circuit court explained that Dowdy needed to
demonstrate not only that the subject for which excerpt assistance was sought,
i.e., Dowdy’s alleged alibi, would be a significant factor in his defense but also
that he would be prejudiced without the services of an investigator.”).
234. Id. at 713.
235. See supra Section IV(A) (analyzing the particularized need standard in
the Husske strain of cases).
236. See supra Section IV(B) (discussing the particularized need standard in
the Dowdy and Lawlor strain of cases).
237. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
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factor in his defense, but that it be reasonable to the defense, which
is what the court called a particularized need showing. 238 This
determination created a heightened showing that departs from Ake
and violates an indigent’s rights to a fair trial, which is seen when
the outcome showing required in Husske and progeny are
compared to Ake on the similar facts where circumstantial
evidence was present in addition to evidence which required the
testimony of an expert witness. 239
In the spectrum of indigent defendants in Virginia, only the
defendants that are so clearly within the particularized need,
because the only evidence brought against them is DNA, will be
properly afforded an expert witness to help prepare a defense. 240
These defendants should be granted expert witnesses due to the
highly technical and probative nature of DNA. Many juries take
DNA results as evidence beyond a reasonable doubt regardless of
how the Commonwealth presents it. 241 Additionally if a defendant
does not have an expert of his or her own then the defendant will
be unable to challenge the DNA evidence at trial. 242 Also, it is
238. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996). The
Husske court explained:
[T]he Supreme Court [has] noted that a trial court properly denied an
indigent defendant’s requests for the appointment of a criminal
investigator, a fingerprint expert, and a ballistics expert . . . because
the defendant’s requests were accompanied by no showing of
reasonableness . . . . Moreover, an indigent defendant’s constitutional
right to the appointment of an expert, at the Commonwealth’s expense,
is not absolute. We hold that an indigent defendant who seeks the
appointment of an expert witness, at the Commonwealth’s expense,
must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates the assistance
of the expert is “likely to be a significant factor in his defense,” and that
he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance. An indigent
defendant may satisfy this burden by demonstrating that the services
of an expert would materially assist him in the preparation of his
defense and that the denial of such services would result in a
fundamentally unfair trial. The indigent defendant who seeks the
appointment of an expert must show a particularized need[.]
Id. (internal citations omitted).
239. See supra Section IV (comparing the standard as applied in differing
Virginia cases).
240. See generally Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 2013);
Dowdy v. Commonwealth, 686 S.E.2d 710 (Va. 2009).
241. See NRC II, supra note 39, at 205 (discussing the bias jurors have
towards DNA evidence as demonstrated through a study).
242. See Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1364.
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possible that some DNA evidence presented might not be produced
using proper methods, or might even be fabricated, and there is no
way for an indigent defendant to challenge the evidence without
an expert. 243
Every other indigent defendant in Virginia where DNA
evidence is presented against them along with other evidence will
likely be denied their motion for an expert witness. The
circumstantial and witness evidence might not even be the
evidence linking the defendant to the crime, yet the DNA evidence,
which is probative by nature, will be used and the defendant will
not be able to challenge it. 244
VI. Solutions
Virginia’s adoption of the heightened standard denies
indigents the “basic tools” for a fair trial. The lack of basic tools
includes the inability to effectively and cogently defend against
complex and scientific evidence that requires an expert to impeach
and is prejudicial in nature. 245 Additionally, if an indigent
defendant is unable to meet Virginia’s heightened standard, then
he or she has no way to guarantee or impeach the evidence for
accuracy or government bias. 246
Absent legislative action or the Supreme Court of the United
States redefining indigent rights to experts, it is up to the Supreme
Court of Virginia to overturn the showing standard established in
Husske, and reinstate the Ake standard. This solution seems
unlikely because the Supreme Court of Virginia has gone back to
Husske time and time again. Additionally, there are policy
arguments for not overturning the Husske standard. 247 The
Virginia courts, which are cash-strapped, already have a practical
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.; see Roth, supra note 22, at 1358 (explaining that the use of DNA
matching evidence makes it difficult for jurors to separate probability of
innocence or guilt from certainty).
246. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (2009).
247. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996) (“[T]his
Due Process requirement, however, does not confer a right upon an indigent
defendant to receive, at the Commonwealth's expense, all assistance that a nonindigent defendant may purchase[.]”).
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interest not to award stipends for expert witnesses for every
criminal defendant, especially if there is inculpatory evidence
outside of the DNA or forensic evidence presented. 248 Also,
granting more expert witnesses increases the time and burden on
the courts. 249
Virginia alternatively could create a DNA and forensic expert
witness system akin to the Public Defender institutions. 250 Such a
system would alleviate the prosecutorial bias of expert
witnesses. 251 Again, the issue of financial and workload burdens
would likely make such a system infeasible. 252
Finances and the amount of cases handled by the courts are a
real issue, but they need to be weighed against justice. Virginia is
creating a system where indigent defendants are significantly
more vulnerable to criminal charges based solely on the type of
evidence presented against them. 253 Indigent defendants are being
treated differently than wealthy defendants because they now
have to make a showing that a wealthy defendant would not need
to make. 254
VII. Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Virginia incorrectly read two Supreme
Court decisions together to create a showing standard not
articulated by the Supreme Court. This heightened showing
required by indigent defendants creates a potential violation of
equal protection, but surely violates the “basic tools required for a
fair trial” when DNA and forensic evidence is presented against a
criminal defendant.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Robin Steinberg, Heeding Gideon's Call in the Twenty-First Century:
Holistic Defense and the New Public Defense Paradigm, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV.
961, 963–64 (2013) (explaining the benefits of a holistic defense from a public
defender).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1364 (highlighting the unfair advantage
a well-funded prosecution has over an indigent defendant).
254. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

